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el CHILE: MUNICIPAL ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES OF THE NATIONAL FUND FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE DIRECT ELECTION OF THE REGIONAL COUNCILLORS
Authors
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Exequiel Gaete Pavez
Investigador independiente
https://orcid.org/0009-0009-2361-3786
Abstract
The objective of this research is to investigate the communal allocation criteria of the National Fund for Regional Development. Additionally, it is expected to investigate possible effects that the electoral reform of 2013 had on the allocation of public resources. For reach this objective, the resources transferred to the country's communes between 2011 and 2018 are analysed, according to socioeconomic, geographic and political variables. Among the main findings of this research is that the allocation of resources has followed mainly socioeconomic criteria, well above political factors. Even so, the main biases in the allocation are found in an overproportion of resources delivered to regional and provincial capital communes, in communes headed by mayors politically aligned with majorities in regional and national governments, and towards those communes in which there are no Regional Councillors who register an electoral domicile in their territories.Keywords:
Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional , distribución local de recursos , descentralización política, descentralización fiscal , reformas electorales regionalesReferences
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